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HAND DELIVERED
Clerk
Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

P.I.E. Employees Federal Credit Union v. Bass
Case No. 19766

Dear Clerk:
Pursuant to Rule 2 4(j)f Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
plaintiff-respondent P.I.E. Employees Federal Credit Union is
hereby notifying the Court of a pertinent and significant
authority that has come to respondent's attention after its
brief was filed. The case is In re Williamson, 43 B.R. 813,
828-829 (Bkrtcy. D. Utah 19 84) and applies to Argument I in
respondent's brief at pp. 2-5. The case is considered to be
pertinent and significant b ecause it holds that under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-23-2(b) (1953 as amended) the Homestead Exemption
does not apply to consensua 1, non-purchase money security
interests. A copy of the c
ase is enclosed. The case was
reversed on other grounds i n In re Williamson, Bankruptcy No.
82C-Q17Q3, C-84-739J, C-84- 747J (D. Utah Memorandum Opinion
September 6, 1985).
As this case is scheduled for oral argument tomorrow
at 9:00 a.m., I would appreciate it if you would bring this
letter to the attention of the Court immediately.
Sincerely,
5ELDZAHLER
ames A. B o e v e r s
JAB;jgm
Enclosure
cc:
Paul

Farr

. *• -

JAN 131987

)
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IN RE WILLIAMSON
Cite as 43 BJR. 813 (Bkrtcy. ISM)

"matured." See also, BANKRUPTCY
SERVICE LAWYERS EDITION, § 21:13
at p. 26 (1979 as amended 1984).
[12] The unsecured claimants in this
case are entitled to interest, in the absence
of a contract providing therefor, at the
legal rate, established by applicable state
law, from the time the respective debts
were incurred until the date a petition under any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code is
filed. In a case under Chapter 7, such as
this one, if there are adequate assets, then
the unsecured creditors would also be entitled to the interest accruing on their claims
post-petition or, if the funds are inadequate
to pay such interest in full, to their pro-rata
share of such funds to be distributed
among all unsecured creditors, to satisfy
their interest claims. See § 726(aX5).
The court reserves for a later determination whether or not interest is due to these
claimants in the event the Packers and
Stockyards Act, 1921 is found to be applicable to the transaction considered herein.
CONCLUSION
It is the opinion of this court that all the
transactions between^ the debtor and the
various sheep ranchers listed here occurring after the moment of 4he filing of the
petition on May 11,1983 are claims entitled
to administrative expense priority under
Section 503(bXlXA) of the Code, as the
actual and necessary costs and expenses of
preserving the estate, while all those occurring prior to the moment of filing are
claims entitled to an unsecured claim priority. The administrative expense claimants,
including Ernest Uhalde, though not entitled to interest, are entitled to the immediate payment of their claims for expenses
from the assets of the estate. The unsecured claims are entitled to payment with
interest at the legal rate in the usual
course of the orderly liquidation of the
estate pursuant to Section 726 of the Code.
The Memorandum Opinion and Order of
January 23, 1983 is withdrawn and the
unsigned judgment predicated therein is a
nullity.

The parties are granted leave to file,
within the time limits and subject matter
restrictions set forth herein, their briefs
relating to the question of the applicability
of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921.
The trustee is ordered to withhold payment of any funds pursuant to this question until the Packers Act question is resolved. An order will enter consistent with
the findings of fact and conclusions of law
set forth herein.
| ttY NUMBER SYSTf M >

In re John IL WILLIAMSON, Debtor.
Bankruptcy No. 82C-01703.
United States Bankruptcy Court,
D. Utah.
July 11, 1984.
Supplemental Opinion Au£. 10. 1984.
Creditor moved for distribution of remaining proceeds of sale of property of
estate, and debtor moved for allowance of
homestead exemption. The Bankruptcy
Court, Glen E. Clark, J., held that: (1)
mechanics' liens for which lien notices did
not contain signature of person making
oaths were invalid; (2) second trust deed
recorded subsequent to improperly perfected mechanics' liens had priority over such
mechanics' liens; (3) parties intended documents entitled "Additional Advance Note
and Agreement" as promissory note evidencing advance of additional funds secured by first trustee, rather than independent second trust deed with separate and
inferior priority; (4) first trust deed and
second trust deed were "security interests"
within Utah Exemption Act which could riot
be defeated by debtor's claim for homestead exemption; (5) valid statutory mechanics' liens were not "security interests"
within Utah Exemption Act; and (6) judicial
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lien was not an exception to debtor's homestead exemption.
Ordered accordingly.
1. Bankruptcy e»257
It was not the intent of Congress to
allow a trustee, in selling property of an
estate, to destroy interests of creditors secured by property. Bankr.Code, 11 UJ3.
CJL § 363(e, f).
2. Bankruptcy «=»339
Creditor claiming interest in property
of estate had right to object to validity of
claims of statutory lienholders. Bankr.
Code, 11 U.S.CJL § 502(a).
3. Bankruptcy «=>267(2)
Where trustee's notice of sale issued
and sale itself took place pursuant to court
approval and upon condition that all those
holding valid statutory liens against real
property of the estate would, upon sale,
continue to hold against proceeds of sale
lien rights equivalent to those extinguished
by the trustee's sale, determination of validity and priority of the various lien rights
against proceeds of the same would be
determined as if those rights had arisen
under state law as statutory, mechanics'
liens charged against the real property of
the estate. Bankr.Code, U U-S.OA.
§ 101(39).
4. States <*=>4.10
Where Congress has not preempted applicable state law, that law governs.
5. Oath e»l
An "oath" is an affirmation of truth of
a statement, which renders one willfully
asserting an untruth punishable for perjurySee publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
6. Oath<S=>l
In its strict sense, term "oath" refers
to attestation coupled with invocation to
supreme being to witness words of attesting party and to visit him with judgment if
the words be false; in its more general

sense, the term includes any attestation or
&&umathn whereby party signifies that he
is bound in conscience to perform an act
faithfully or speak truly, regardless whether or not that attestation invokes supreme
being or is accompanied by conditional self<Wsing.
7. Oath«=»l
In Utah, term "oath" is used in its
general sense to include concept of an affirmation. U.C.A.1953, 68-3-12(2); Utah
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 43(d).
8. O a t h * *
In Utah, essentials of an "oath" are a
solemn declaration, manifestation of intent
to be bound by the statement, signature of
ths declarer, and acknowledgment by an
authorized person that the oath was taken.
9. Acknowledgment «=>1
An "acknowledgment" is a formal declaratioD attached to a written instrument,
and constitutes an oath or affirmation, but
only to the effect that person making the
acknowledgment is same as person executing the instrument being acknowledged.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
10. Acknowledgment *=»36(2)
A "certification," also called the "jurat," constitutes official verification that
must accompany all valid oaths in Utah; by
means of this verification, the official administering an acknowledgment certifies,
pursuant to statute, that person signing
th^t oath actually appeared before the official, and that the person was either personally known by the official to be signatory
of the instrument or that the acknowledging party was proved to the official to be
the signatory by the oath or affirmation of
a credible witness known personaffy to the
official U.C.A.1953, 57-2-6.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
11. Mechanics' Liens «=»154<2)
In Utah, every valid notice of mechanic's lien must contain an oath verifying
truth of its contents, an oath acknowledg-

IN RE WILLIAMSON
Cite as 43 BJL 813 (Bkitcy. 1W4)

ing identity of person executing it, and an
official certification verifying those oaths.
U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7, 57-2-1.
12. Acknowledgment <3=»36(1)
In Utah, essential parts of a notary's
certificate constitute the essential parts of
the certificate of any other official authorized to certify acknowledgments; those
essential parts are the official's signature,
the official's title, his place of residence,
and the date his commission as a notary or
other authorization expires. U.C.A.1953,
46-1-8, 57-2-5.
13. Mechanics' Liens «=>154(6)
Under Utah law, oaths and acknowledgments on notices of mechanic's lien
were void, and therefore, the notices were
invalid, absent signature of the person
making the oaths. U.C.A.1953.38-1-7. 572-2.
14. Mechanics9 Liens S=>154(6)
Under Utah law, oath on notice of mechanic's lien lacked proper signatory and
was consequently invalid, rendering the
lien notice a nullity, where line reserved for
signature of person making the acknowledgment was signed erroneously by notary
public. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7, 57-2-2.
15. Mechanics' Liens $=154(6)
Even if identical signatures beneath
oath and acknowledgment and beneath notary's certification on notice of mechanic's
lien were those of same person signing as
lien claimant and as notary, lien notice
would remain a nullity under Utah law in
that notary could not notarize instrument
in which he was named a party. U.C.A.
1953, 38-1-7, 46-1-10, 57-2-2.
16. Mechanics' Liens «=>154(6)
Under Utah law, notice of mechanic's
lien was invalid where notary certificate
failed to contain expiration date of notary's
commission. U.C.A.1953, 46-1-8.
17. Mechanics' Liens 4=>116
In Utah, substantial compliance with
technicalities is sufficient to create validity
of lien notices.
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18. Mechanics' Liens e»154(6)
Under Utah law, if signature of lien
claimant appeared anywhere on acknowledgment or if notary had appended on the
certificate his commission expiration date,
regardless of its form, completeness, position or even accuracy, then there would
have been basis for finding substantial
compliance with Utah law; but complete
absence of oath, acknowledgment, or jurat
was fatal to validity of lien notice. U.C.A.
1953, 38-1-7, 46-1-8, 57-2-2.
19. Estoppel <s»98(l)
Creditor who had nothing to do with
creating defective lien notices was not estopped from attacking validity of the lien
notices. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-1 et seq.
20. Mechanics' Liens <3=> 132(1)
Under Utah law, mechanic's lien for
which notice was filed 102 days after last
material was furnished was invalid regardless of whether claimant was general contractor or subcontractor. U.OA.1953, 381-7.
21. Mechanics' Liens «=> 136(2)
Property description which contained
identifying lot number, alternative reference to street name as a circle or a drive,
and a numerical address was in substantial
compliance with requirement of Utah lien
notice statute. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7.
22. Mechanics' Liens «=>154(4)
Lien notice was valid where person
signing on behalf of claimant signed notice
and took and signed oath and acknowledgment, despite fact that erroneous entry
was made in second blank identifying
claimant U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7.
23. Mortgages <&=>151(3)
Under Utah law, lien of holder of second trust deed recorded subsequent to recording of mechanics' liens had priority
over those mechanics' liens which were not
properly perfected with valid lien notices.
U.C.A.1953, 57-3-2, 57-3-3.
24. Mortgages <8=»151(3)
Under Utah law, valid mechanics' liens
which related back to June 4, 1981 had
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priority over second trust deed recorded on
December 2, 1981. U.C.A.1953, 57-3-2,
57-3-3.
25. Mortgages <8=>151(5)
Under Utah law, judgment lien which
attached to subject property after holder of
second trust deed perfected its lien had
priority standing inferior to that of holder
of the second trust deed.
26. Mortgages «=>121
In Utah, the advance of additional
funds secured by previously executed and
otherwise valid trust deed is allowed in
circumstances where the note and trust
deed contain clear language that the parties intend to avail themselves of this type
of arrangement
27. Mortgages c=>121
Parties intended documents entitled
"Additional Advance Note and Agreement"
as promissory note evidencing advance of
additional funds secured by first trust
deed, rather than independent second trust
deed with separate and inferior priority
standing.
28. Homestead <&=»90, 96
Term "security interests," in statutory
exception to Utah homestead exemption includes, but is not limited to, security interests for the purchase price of the property
to which the security interest attaches, and
embraces any consensual security interest
in the property by which the owner of the
property voluntarily pledges that property
as security for a debt regardless of the
purpose of the debt U.C.A.1953, 78-233(2Xb).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
29. Homestead e=>96
First trust deed and second trust deed
were "security interests" within meaning
of Utah Exemption Act which could not be
defeated by debtor's claim for homestead
exemption. U.C.A.1953, 78-23-3<2)(b).
30. Homestead <£»97
Valid statutory mechanics' liens which
were not consensual were not "security

interests," and were not "judicial liens"
within Utah Exemption Act, and thus were
not valid exceptions to debtor's homestead
exemption. U.C.A.1953, 78-23-3(2)(b).
31. Homestead e=>90
Judicial lien was not an exception to
debtor's homestead exemption under Utah
Exemption Act where it was not a security
interest and where there was no evidence
that it was for a debt created for purchase
price of the property. U.C.A.1953, 78-233(2Xb).
Supplemental Opinion
32. Homestead «=»90
Under Utah Exemption Act, homestead
exemption, regardless <of when it is claimed
or recorded, takes priority over all other
liens and encumbrances burdening the subject property with exception of those encumbrances listed in the statute. U.C.A.
1953, 78-23-1 et seq., 7&-23-3(2Xa-c);
Const Art 22, § 1

Joel R. Dangerfield of Roe, Fowler &
Moxley, for Claude Hawk Corp.
Robert C. Miner of Thomas J. Klc and
Associates, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah, for
mechanics' lienholders Maxfield Plumbing,
Rite Cabinet, Inc., Jim Williams dba J^W.
Electric, and James D. Featherstone dba J
& J Tile Co.
Ronald C. Barker, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for mechanics' lienholders Stringham Lumber Co. and V & H Enterprises.
Marcella L. Keck, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for mechanic's lienholder Jeff Merchant
dba Artistic Landscaping.
Bruce A. Maak of Rooker, Larsen, Kimball & Parr, Salt Lake City, Utah, for State
Sav. and Loan Ass'n.
Sid Siverson pro se.
Alan D. Frandsen, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for Parley White dba Parley White Realty.
Wendell P. Abies, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for debtor, John H. Williamson.

IN RE WILLIAMSON
Ctteas43BJL813 (Bkrtcy. 1984)

Theodore E. Kanell of Hanson, Russon &
Dunn, Salt Lake City, Utah, the trustee, on
his own behalf.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GLEN E. CLARK, Bankruptcy Judge.
CASE SUMMARY
In this case, the court is called upon to
determine the priority of certain liens and
encumbrances against proceeds of the sale
of property of the estate. The issue of
priority turns upon four questions: (1)
whether or not certain statutory mechanics' liens are valid and enforceable under
Utah law and (2), if so, what distributive
priority they may have in this case; (3)
whether a recorded document constitutes
an independent second trust deed with a
separate and inferior priority standing of
its own or whether it is, instead, a notice of
the advance of additional funds secured by
the first trust deed, made in favor of the
lender and having a priority superior to all
other liens and encumbrances; and (4)
whether or not the debtor'^ claimed homestead exemption is valid and, if so, what
priority it has in this case; or, in the alternative, whether the debtor is entitled to
payment of a real estate commission as an
administrative expense foe his role as a
listing agent in the sale of the property of
the estate.

FACTS, PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND, AND
ARGUMENTS
On July 14,1982, debtor John H. Williamson filed a petition for relief under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The case was
1. Out of these proceeds there must yet be paid,
if allowed, the closing costs of sale, the debtor's
homestead exemption, the trustee's fees, as well
as amounts to the holders of valid statutory
mechanics' liens.
2. In its motion, Claude Hawk, a secured „ creditor, argued that the sale proceeds are subject to
the following undisputed liens in the following
order of priority:
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converted to one under Chapter 7 on June
8, 1983.
On July 21, 1983, the Chapter 7 trustee,
pursuant to Section 363(c) and (f) of the
Code, noticed his intent to sell, free and
clear of liens, the real property belonging
to the estate. The trustee stated in his
notice of this sale that the liens encumbering the property would be "transferred" to
the sale proceeds.
On August 15, 1983, the court approved
the sale of the property for $335,000.00.
The sale was closed pursuant to the trustee's notice. On August 15, the court further ordered the following payments to be
made from the sale proceeds; (a) $200,000.00 to State Savings & Loan
Association ("State Savings"), pursuant to
its first trust deed recorded June 4, 1981;
(b) $10,050.00 to the real estate agency
of Gump & Ayres as payment of its 3
percent sales commission;
(c) $3,500.00 in full payment of the outstanding real estate taxes due for 1981,
1982, and, as prorated, for 1983.
Pursuant to the court's order, the balance of the proceeds, $121,450.00, was to
be held in trust, pending further determination of the priority of the remaining liens
which, by virtue of the trustee's notice and
the court's order, had attached to these
proceeds.1
On August 29, 1983, the debtor was discharged.
On December 19, 1983, Claude Hawk
Corporation ("Claude Hawk") moved this
court for distribution of the remaining proceeds and for an order determining the
distributive priority of the claims that have
attached thereto, pursuant to the notice of
the trustee and order of the court.2
(1) Real property taxes for 1981, 1982, and, as
prorated,, for 1983 in the sum of $3,500.00;
(2) The debt owed to State Savings and Loan
Association, secured by a Deed of Trust recorded in Salt Lake County on June 4, 1981 as Entry
No. 3571498 in the sum of $200,000.00;
(3) The debt owed to State Savings and LoanAssociation, evidenced by a document recorded
in Salt Lake County on December 2, 1981 as
Entry No. 3628145 in the sum of $45,000.00
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In its motion, Claude Hawk contended
that the following mechanics9 lien notices,
in the amounts shown, are invalid:
(1) Rite Cabinets, Inc. for $8,454.00
(2) Gunner Anderson for $3,500.00
(3) Sid Siverson dba S & S Construction
for $5,800.00
(4) Jim Williams dba J.W. Electric for
$2,414.00
(5) James D. Featherstone dba J & J Tile
Co. for $6,800.00
(6) Jeff Merchant dba Artistic Landscaping for $3,346.00 (two hen notices)
(7) Fred Levin dba Fred's Glass Shop for
$1,617.00
(8) Tom Williams dba Tom Williams Construction for $2,400.00
(9) Maxfield Plumbing, Inc. for $6,156.00
(10) Edward H. Poulsen dba AJAX Insulation for $720.25
(11) V & U Enterprises for $4,720.03
(12) Stringham Lumber Co. for $2,369.88
(13) Jerry D. Jackson of Rain Gutter and
Aluminum Products for $463.65
(14) Earl J. Hemmert, Sr. dba Aire Flo
Heating and Electric for $669.64
Claude Hawk admits that these liens,
arising under Utah law, would ordinarily
take priority over its own trust deed because each of them relates back in time to
June 4,1981, when the first work began on
or the first materials were furnished to the
subject property. However, Claude Hawk
argues that, in this case, the lien notices
are invalid for the following technical reasons: the first twelve (12) claimants filed

State Savings argues only that, regardte&s of the outcome of the priority battle
between Claude Hawk and the mechanics,
the priority standing of State Savings is
superior to all other interest holders because both its original loan of $200,000.00
a^d its subsequent loan of $45,000.00 are
secured by the first trust deed which holds
top priority. State Savings denies the existence of any second trust deed and asserts that the second loan was an advance
°f additional funds secured by the first
trust deed, pursuant to the provisions contained in the pertinent loan documents and
a* allowed by Utah law.
On January 19, 1984, a hearing was held
before this court 1 At this hearing, Claude

(reduced by $10,000.00 which was never paid
out to the debtor);
(4) Allowable trustee's fees up to $3350.00;
(5) The 3 percent real estate commission to
Gump & Ayres in the sum of $10,050.00;
(6) Hie homestead exemption of John H. Williamson in the sum of $8,000.00;
(7) Costs of sale, closing costs, and costs of
tide insurance in an unknown sum.
(8) The secured debt owed to Claude Hawk
Corporation evidenced by the trust deed recorded in Salt Lake County on December 2, 1981 as
Entry No. 3628146 in die sum of $44,950.00
with interest at the annual rate of 15 percent
front June 3, 1981, yielding $18.47 per day, plus
costs of $182.80 and a reasonable attorney's fee
of $2334-50 (which debt Claude Hawk agreed to
subordinate to the interests of State Savings).

3. Joel R. Dangerfield of the Salt Lake City firm
tof Roe, Fowler & Moxley appeared for Claude
Uawk. Robert C. Miner of the Salt Lake City
firm of Thomas J. Klc and Associates, Incx,
appeared for mechanics' lienholders Maxfield
Plumbing. Rite Cabinet, Inc^ Jim Williams dba
4.W. Electric, and James D. Featherstone dba J
fe J Tile Co. Ronald C. Barker of Salt Lake City
appeared for mechanics' lienholders Stringham
Lumber Co. and V & H Enterprises. Marcella
L Keck of Salt Lake City appeared for mechanic's lienholder Jeff Merchant dba Artistic Landscaping. Bruce A. Maak of the Salt Lake City
firm of Rooker, Larsen. Kimball & Parr apbeared for State Savings. Sid Siverson of Salt
Lake City appeared pro se. Alan D. Frandsen of
%ah Lake City appeared for Parley White dba

notices containing fatally defective acknowledgments or certificates; claimant
number thirteen (13) in the list filed his
notice after the 100 day deadline established by controlling Utah law; and the last
claimant in the list, number fourteen (14),
filed a notice that does not contain an accurate description of the property against
w
h k h the lien is charged.
The holders of these allegedly defective
a^d invalid lien notices filed responses arguing, on the contrary, that any defects in
these notices are de minimus, that the
notices are in substantial compliance with
Utah law, and that the claims of these
mechanics' lienholders have priority over
the claim of Claude Hawk because their
h*ns relate back to June 4, 1981, a time
before Claude Hawk's trust deed was recorded.

IN RE WILLIAMSON
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Hawk withdrew its objection to the mechanics' liens of Stringham Lumber Co. and
V & H Enterprises and stated that the
remaining judgment lien of Parley White,
though technically valid, was recorded in
Salt Lake County on May 6,1982, after the
Claude Hawk trust deed was recorded.
The court also heard arguments on behalf
of certain of the parties.' Then, upon request of debtor's counsel, the debtor was
granted leave to brief the issue of the
validity and priority of debtor's homestead
exemption and debtor's alternative claim
for a real estate commission for the work
performed as listing agent in the sale of
the property of the estate. Other parties
were granted leave to file opposing briefs.
The court took all matters addressed at the
hearing under advisement
On January 31, 1984, pursuant to the
leave of court, the debtor filed a motion for
allowance of his homestead exemption or,
in the alternative, for the allowance of his
real estate commission as an administrative
expense. The debtor argued that he filed
his notice of homestead exemption on August 26, 1982 and waived his claim for real
estate commission provided he would obtain that exemption. He also asserted that
there was no objection to his exemption
until the "final gasp of the oral argument"
on January 19, 1984.
Claude Hawk filed its memorandum in
opposition to the debtor's motion for the
allowance of his homestead exemption, arguing that such exemption is inferior in
priority to the lien of Claude Hawk and
that the debtor is not entitled, in the alternative or otherwise, to any real estate commission for the sale of the property of the
estate.
The debtor replied to the memorandum in
opposition of Claude Hawk, arguing that
Claude Hawk had knowledge of debtor's
role as a listing agent and waived its objection to debtor's alternative claim for a real
estate commission by failing to object
thereto and that debtor, as a "disinterested
Parley White Realty. Wendell P. AWes appeared for the debtor, John H. Williamson.
Theodore £. Kanell of the Salt Lake City firm of
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person" within the context of Section
101(13) of the Code, is entitled to a nunc
pro tunc order approving his professional
services for which compensation should be
paid as an administrative expense.
Stringham Lumber Co. and V & H Enterprises, creditors and mechanics' tienholders
(to whose hens Claude Hawk withdrew its
objection) filed their own objections to the
allowance of the debtor's claim for homestead exemption, arguing that the debtor
waived his claim for real estate commission, that his application for commission
(made in the alternative) is not timely, and
that the homestead exemption, under Utah
law, is inferior to mechanics' liens securing
sums owed for improvements on residential
property
THE ISSUES
The issues to be resolved are:
(1) whether or not certain mechanics'
liens, which now constitute liens on the
proceeds of the sale of estate property,
sold free and clear of Hens pursuant to
Section 363 of the Code, are valid and enforceable under Utah law, and
(2) if so, whether or not they have priority superior to the lien of Claude Hawk;
(3) whether or not the document of State
Savings recorded in Salt Lake County on
December 2, 1981 as Entry No. 3628145 in
the sum of $45,000.00 (reduced by $10,000.00 representing funds not advanced)
constitutes an independent second trust
deed with a separate priority Handing inferior to the valid mechanics' Bens or whether it is, instead, a notice of advance of
additional funds secured by the first trust
deed, made in favor of State Savings and
having a priority standing superior to all
other liens against the proceeds; and
(4) whether or not the debtor has a valid
homestead exemption, and if so, what priority said exemption has under Utah law; or,
in the alternative, whether or not the debtor is entitled to a real estate commission, to
Hanson, Russon ft Dunn, the trustee, appeared
on his own behalf.
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be paid as an administrative expense, for
the sale of the property of the estate.
DECISION
(1)
The Validity of the Mechanics' Liens
On July 21, 1983, the trustee of this
Chapter 7 case noticed, pursuant to Section
363(c) and (f) of the Code, a sale of certain
real property of the estate, free and clear
of liens.
[11 Section 363(f) of the Code provides
that
The Trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section free and
clear of any interest in such property of
an entity other than the estate . . .
It is clear from the Code that it was not the
intent of Congress to allow a trustee, in
selling property of the estate, to destroy
the interests of creditors secured by said
property. Section 363(e) of the Code provides that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of
this section, at any time, on request of an
entity that has an interest in property
used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be
used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, the
court shall prohibit or condition such use,
sale, or lease as is necessary to provide
adequate protection of such interest
In this case, no creditor moved the court
for "adequate protection." This was undoubtedly due to the fact that the trustee,
in his notice of intended sale, indicated that
all liens against the subject real property,
as to the extent such liens were valid,
would be "transferred" to the proceeds of
sale.4

[2] On December 19, 1983, Claude
Hawk, in its application for distribution of
proceeds of the trustee's sale, objected to
the validity and priority of the claims of 14
statutory Jienholders. As a creditor claiming an interest in the property of the estate, Claude Hawk has the right to object
to the validity of these other claims, pursuant to Section 502(a) of the Code, which
provides, in pertinent part:
A claim or interest, proof of which is
filed under Section 501 of this title, is
deemed allowed, unless a party in interest, including a creditor of a partner in a
partnership that is a debtor in a case
under chapter 7 of this title, objects.
"There is no doubt that the phrase 'parties
in interest' applies to those who [like
Claude Hawk in this case] have some interest in the assets of the debtor being administered in the case." COLLIER'S ON
BANKRUPTCY, 15th ed., 1501.01 at p.
502-12.
The question raised by Claude Hawk is
which, if any, of these 14 liens is valid.5
[3] The court finds that the trustee's
notice of sale issued and the sale itself took
place pursuant to court approval and upon
the condition that all those holding valid
statutory liens against the real property of
the estate would, upon sale, continue to
hold against the proceeds of sale lien rights
equivalent to those extinguished by the
trustee's sale. For this reason, the determination of the validity and priority of the
various lien rights against the proceeds of
the sale must be determined as if those
rights had arisen under Utah law as statutory mechanics' liens% charged against the
real property of the estate.

ate to extinguish these statutory liens entirely
4. It is clear from the legislative history of the
and give to the former lienholders a totally new
Code that what the trustee designated as a
secured status in the proceeds of the sale. Nor
, "transfer" of liens could constitute adequate
is the court called upon to determine whether
protection of the lienholders' interests under
or not such new security interests would be
Section 363(e). H.R. 95-595 p. 345, U.S.Code
entitled to the same priority standing they forCong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5787, 6301. See
also, In the Matter of Circus Time, Inc., 5 B.R. 1 merly had under state law.
(Bkrtcy.Ct.Maine 1979); COLLIER'S ON BANK6. The following explanation appears in COLRUPTCY, 15th ed. 1f 363.07.
LIER'S ON BANKRUPTCY, 15th ed., ff 101.28 at
p. 101-67:
5. The court is not called upon to determine
The definition of "lien" is new [in the 1978
whether the trustee's notice and sale of the
subject property with court approval could operBankruptcy Code] and is intended to encom-
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[4] Article I, Section 8, of the United
States Constitution provides that "Congress shall have power to establish uniform
laws of bankruptcy" throughout the United
States. Where Congress has not pre-empted applicable state law, that law governs.
The determination of the validity and priority of statutory liens against the proceeds
in this case must be made in light of the
applicable Utah law governing the creation,
validity, and effect of the mechanics' liens
originally filed against the real property of
the estate whose sale gave rise to the proceeds now charged with these same liens.
See, Butner v. United States, 4 Bank.Ct
Dec. 1259 (1979).
Those controlling provisions of Utah law
appear in the Utah Code Annotated Sections 38-1-1 et seq. and 57-2-1 et seq.
(1953, as amended).
(a) Technical Requirements of Mechanics'
Liens in Utah
Section 38-1-7 requires the individual executing a notice of claim of mechanic's lien
to verify the contents of such a notice with
an oath.7
Section 57-2-1 requires that every writing affecting real estate be acknowledged
according to the provision of Utah Code
Ann. Section 57-2-1 et seq. (1953) (Utah's
version of the Uniform Acknowledgments
Act).
The distinction between an oath and an
acknowledgment is this:
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[5-8] An oath is an affirmation of £he
truth of a statement, which renders one
willfully asserting an untruth punishable
for perjury. In its strict sense the term
refers to an attestation that is coupled with
an invocation to the Supreme Being to witness the words of the attesting party and
to visit him with judgment if the words be
false. In its more general sense, the term
oath includes any attestation or affirmation
whereby a party signifies that he is bound
in conscience to perform an act faithfully
or speak truly, regardless whether or not
that attestation invokes the Supreme Being
or is accompanied by a conditional selfcursing. In Utah the term'oath is used in
its general sense to include the concept of
an "affirmation." Utah Code Ann. Section
68-3-12(2) (1953); Rule 43(d) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Moreover, in Utah:
. . . the essentials of an oath are: 1. A
solemn declaration. 2. Manifestation of
intent to be bound by the statement 3.
Signature of the declarer. 4. Acknowledgment by an authorized person that
the oath was taken.
McKnight v. State Land BdL, 14 Utah 2d
726, 381 P.2d 726, at 734 (1963).
[9] An acknowledgment* on the other
hand, is a formal declaration which is attached to a written instrument This declaration constitutes an oath or affirmation,
but only to the effect that the person making the acknowledgment is the same as the
person executing the instrument being acknowledged.

whether or not statutory, but does not include
pass all three kinds of liens defined under the
Code; judicial liens, security interests, and
statutory interest or judicial lien, whether or
statutory liens. The word lien" is defined as
not such interest or lien is provided by or is
a charge against or interest in property to
dependent on a statute and whether or not
secure payment of a debt or performance of
such interest is made fully effective by statute.
an obligation
Although the existence and
In the words of the 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY
effect of liens are ordinarily to be determined
MANUAL, 3rd ed., H 545.01 at p. 545-1:
by state law, state law should not be applied
A statutory lien is one that arises automaticalwhere its application would frustrate or debily and is not based on an agreement to give a
litate federally enacted policy. Di Pierro v.
lien or on a judicial action. Mechanics', maCullen (In re Taddeo), 4 C.B.C2d 185 (B.CLJE.
terialmen's, warehousemen's, and tax liens
D.N.Y.), aff'd, 5 C.B.C.2d 1309 (EJ).N.Y.1981),
are examples [of statutory liens].
aff'd, 685 F.2d 24, 6 C.B.C.2d 1201 (2d Cir.
1982).
7. In First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 631
Section 101(39) of the Code defines a statutory
?J2d 919 (Utah 1981), the court held that a
lien as follows:
mechanic's lien was invalid because, though it
... "statutory lien" means lien arising solely
was properly acknowledged, it was not verified
by force of a statute on specified circumstancby an oath as to the truth of its contents.
es or conditions, or lien of distress for rent
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flOJ A certification, also called the "jurat," constitutes the official verification
that must accompany all valid oaths in
Utah. By means of this verification, the
official administering the acknowledgment
certifies, pursuant to Utah Code.Ann. Section 57-2-6 (1953), that (1) the person signing that oath actually appeared before the
official, and that (2) said person was either
personally known by the official to be the
signatory of the instrument or (3) that the
acknowledging party was proved to the
official to be the signatory by the oath or
affirmation of a credible witness known
personally to the official

(1) The purpose of the phrase "STATE
OF UTAH, COUNTY OF
:ss" is to
indicate the venue in which the oath is
made. The "ss" is a contraction of the
Latin word "scilicet," which means "to
wit." Neither the venue information or the
"ss" is material to the document See,
McCord & Nave Merchantile Co. v. Glen,
6 Utah 139, 21 P. 500, at 501 (1889).
(2) Following this is the formal declaration containing the oath as to the contents
of the notice and the acknowledgment of
the signature. This declaration begins
with a blank line in which is to be written
the name of the person signing both the
notice of lien and this declaration.

[11] Thus, in Utah, every valid notice of
mechanic's lien must contain an oath veri(3)' Following the opening blank line is
fying the truth of its contents, an oath
acknowledging the identity of the person ~the phrase "being first duly sworn." In
executing it, and an official certification actuaf practice, an individual taking an oath
before a notary does not normally raise his
verifying those oaths.
In this case, 12 of the 14 lien notices arm to the square and solemnly repeat the
were identical in form. On the front side words of the oath as is done by a witness
of these 12 notice forms appeared the legal prior to testifying in court or at a deposilanguage perfecting a valid mechanic's lien tion. Instead the usual practice is for the
under Utah law. This language was inter- affiant (that is, the person desiring to be
spersed with blanks to be filled in with the bound by an oath) to appear before the
appropriate details required by the mechan- authorized official and sign the attestation,
ic's lien statute (Utah Code Ann. Section indicating that he is making the declaration
38-1-7 (1981)), On the reverse side of this upon his oath or affirmation.
notice appeared the following declaration
(4) Following this language is the phrase
which contained language that, apparently, "says that he is
was to serve (1) as the signatory's oath as claimant, in the foregoing Notice of Lien."
to the contents of the notice, (2) the oath By these words, the person whose name
acknowledging the signature on the notice, appears in the opening blank attests, under
and (3) the official verification:
oath, that he is the same person who
STATE OF UTAH
I
signed the Notice of Lien. In the blank
:ss
which appears in this phrase, this person
COUNTY OF
)
may provide information setting forth his
being first duty sworn, says that relationship to the hen claimant Although
he is
claimants in the foregoing No- Utah law does not require that this infortice of Lien;" that he has read said notice and
mation be given, it is often helpful to estabknows the contents thereof, and that the same is
lish the relationship between the lien claimtrue of his own knowledge.
ant and the individual signing the lien notice and taking the required oaths, for very
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
often it is a principal, agent, or employee of
day of
, 19
the claimant that signs the lien notice and
appears before the official to sign the acNotary Public
knowledgment
It will be necessary to analyze this decla(5) Following this is the phrase "that he
ration phrase by phrase:
has read said notice and knows the con-
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tents thereof, and that the same is true of
his own knowledge." By this language the
person signing the declaration attests that
he, as the same person who signed the
notice of lien, knows that the contents
thereof are true.
(6) Following this is another blank line.
This is for the signature of the person who
signed the notice and whose name appears
in the opening blank of the acknowledgment This signature is a necessary element of both the oath attesting to the truth
of the contents of the notice of lien and of
the oath acknowledging the signature
thereon. McKnight v. Land BcL, supra.
[12] (7) Following this is the certificate
or verification, also called a "jurat," of the
official authorized to administer the acknowledgment In most cases, this official
is a notary public. In rare cases it may be
a judge or clerk of the court, or some other
public official. Utah Code Ann. Section
57-2-5 (1953). The essential parts of this
certificate are set forth in Utah Code Ann.
Section 46-1-8 (1953), which provides that:
To all acknowledgments, oaths, affirmations and instruments of every kind taken and certified by a notary public he
shall afix to his signature his official title
and his place of residence, and the date
on which his commission expires.
This court concludes that, in Utah, the essential parts of a notary's certificate constitute the essential parts of the certificate of
any other official authorized to certify acknowledgments. Those essential parts are
(1) the official's signature, (2) the official's
title, (3) his place of residence (meaning the
city or county and state in which he resides), and (4) the date his commission, as a
notary or other authorization, expires. It
will be necessary to analyze the elements
of the jurat that appeared on the Ken notices in this case:
(a) The first phrase of the jurat is "Subscribed and sworn to before me . . . " The
purpose of this language is to certify that
the person making the foregoing acknowledgment did, in fact, appear before the
official and did subscribe to the acknowledgment and oath in the declaration. In
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other words, it is to certify that the signatory voluntarily signed the declaration in
the presence of the certifying official under
penalty of perjury should his declaration
prove to be false.
(b) Following this language in the jurat,
is the phrase "this
day of
.
19 " Into these blanks
the official before whom the oaths are executed fills in the numerals and words setting forth the date on which the signatory
appeared before the official and subscribed
to the declaration. The court finds, in light
of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 46-1-8, that the date on which the
certification was made does not constitute
one of the essential parts of the certificate.
(c) Following this is a blank line for the
signature of the official administering the
oath. The court finds, in light of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 46-1-8,
that the official is not only required to afix
his signature, but must also afix his official
title (e.g., notary public, clerk of court,
judge, etc), his residence (city or county,
and state) and the expiration date of his
commission to administer oaths.
(b) Application of Utah Law to the Lien
Notices in this Case.
On ten lien notices in this case, the person whose name appeared in the opening
blank of the acknowledgment failed to sign
i t In McKnight v. Land Bd., supra, the
court held that such a signature is a necessary element of an oath. In Graff v. Boise
Cascade Corp., 660 P.2d 721 (Utah 1983),
the court held that the absence of the name
appearing to identify the person verifying
the claim and the absence of the signature
of the person who purportedly swore, under oath, as to the veracity of the claim
rendered the notice invalid.
[13-15] Taken together, these cases
clearly stand for the proposition that, in
Utah, the signature of the person making a
written oath is essential. Absent this signature, the oath and acknowledgment are
void. Without the oath and the acknowledgment, the requirements of Utah Code
Ann. Sections 3&-1-7 and 57-2-2 (1953) are
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not met; and the notice of lien is, therefore, invalid.
For these reasons, this court holds that
the lien notices of the following ten (10)
claimants are invalid for lack of this essential signature:
(1) Rite Cabinets, Inc. for $8,454.00
(2) Gunner Anderson for $3,500.00
(3) Sid Siverson dba S & S Construction
for $5,800.00
(4) Jim Williams dba J.w/ Electric for
$2,414.00
(5) James D. Featherstone dba J £ J Tile
Co. for $6,800.00
(6) Jeff Merchant dba Artistic Landscaping for $3,346.00 (two lien notices)
(7) Fred Levin dba Fred's Glass Shop for
$1,617.00
(8) Tom Williams dba Tom Williams Construction for $2,400.00
(9) Maxfield
Plumbing,
Inc.
for
$6,156.00 *
(10) Edward H. Poulsen dba AJAX Insulation for $720.25 *
[16] In reaching this decision, the court
is aware that Jeff Merchant dba Artistic
Landscaping, recorded two notices of lien
for the same claim, one on June 18, 1982,
and another on June 29, 1982. Apparently,
the second notice was intended to correct
defects in the first Unfortunately, both
notices are invalid: the first, because the
acknowledgment was not signed by Jeff
Merchant; and the second, because the notary certificate is improper for failure to
contain an essential element of the notary's
certificate, namely, the expiration date of
the notary's commission.
8. On this notice, the line reserved for the signature of the person making the acknowledgment
was signed erroneously by the notary public.
The oath, therefore, lacks a proper signatory
and is, consequently invalid, rendering the lien
notice a nullity.
9. On this notice, the signature beneath the oath
and acknowledgment is identical to that beneath the notary's certification. The court believes that these signatures are those of the
notary and that, for this reason, the notice is
invalid. However, even if these two signatures
were those of Edward Poulsen, signing as lien

[17] Although, in Utah, substantial
compliance with these technicalities is sufficient to create validity, nevertheless, the
absence of an essential element has been
held by the Utah Supreme Court to render
an otherwise valid lien notice technically
defective. See, Graff v. Boise Cascade,
supra, at 722-23.
[18] If the signature of the claimant
had appeared anywhere on the acknowledgment or if the notary had appended on the
certificate his commission expiration date—
regardless of its form, completeness, position or even accuracy—then there would
have been a basis for finding substantial
compliance with Utah law. But the complete absence of an essential element of an
oath, acknowledgment, or jurat is, in Utah,
fatal to the validity of the lien notice.
[19J All the lien notices addressed so
far, except for the second lien notice of
Jeff Merchant, were completed, acknowledged, and notarized by the debtor, John
H. Williamson. Because of this fact, these
lien claimants argue that, whatever their
defects, these notices should not be invalidated since any errors in them were the
fault of the debtor and not of the claimants. This estoppel argument would be a
persuasive defense against an attack made
on these notices by the debtor, who could
not be allowed to enjoy the fruits of his
errors at the expense of those injured
thereby. However, in this case, the lien
notices are being attacked by another creditor, Claude Hawk, who, according to the
record before the court, had nothing to do
with creating the defective notices. As to
him the lienholders' estoppel argument, although not designated as such, must fail.10
claimant and as notary, the result would be the
same because, in Utah, a notary is disqualified
from notarizing an instrument in which he is
named as a party. See, Utah Code Ann. Section
46-1-10 (1953, as amended).
10. See, Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah
1974), where the court held that the new husband's statement that support money from the
natural father was unwanted did not estop the
mother of the children owed support or the
children themselves from bringing an action
against the natural father to recover the support
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[20] The provisions of Utah's medianic's lien statute require that a lien notice be
filed within 80 days after the date the last
material was furnished if the claimant is a
subcontractor and 100 days after such date
if the claimant is a general contractor.
Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-7 (1981).
With regard to the notice of lien of Jerry
D. Jackson of Rain Gutter and Aluminum
Products, the court finds that the essential
technical elements of the oath, acknowledgment and verification were met However,
the lien notice shows, on its face, that the
last materials were furnished on February
25, 1982, and the notice was recorded on
June 8,1982. Counting February 26 as the
first day and June 7 as the last, the court
finds that this lien notice was filed 102
days after the last materials were furnished. Whether Jerry D. Jackson was a
general contractor or a subcontractor is
immaterial since this notice, filed after 102
days, is late under either provision of the
statute. For these reasons, the court finds
that this lien is invalid
[21] With regard to the lien notice of
Aire Flo Heating and Electric ("Aire Flo"),
the court finds no defect in the oath, the
acknowledgment, or the notary's certificate. Claude Hawk claims, however, that
the description of the property against
which this lien is charged is maccurate.
This is true. The proper description for the
debtor's property was
All of lot 6, Arlington Hills, Plat *F,
known by the address 575 Cambridge
Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah. '
The Aire Flo lien notice contains the following description:
Lot 6. Cambridge Circle or 575 Cambridge Drive, Salt Lake.
Utah law provides that the lien notice contain, inter alia,
. . . a description of the property to be
charged with the lien, sufficient for identification . . .

Utah Code Ann. Section 88-1-7 (1981).
Had Aire Flo failed to put any property
description on its notice of lien or had the
description been clearly erroneous, the lien
would have been defective. But here the
property description is in substantial compliance with the statute. It is "sufficient
for identification/' It contains the identifying lot number, a reference to Cambridge
Circle and Cambridge Drive, and a numerical address. Even if the description might
create some confusion, it is sufficient to
put all parties with interest in the correct
parcel of property on notice of this claimant's lien. Moreover, the Salt Lake County
recorder was able to record the document
in spite of the minor and immaterial defect
in the description. The court finds this lien
notice to be in substantial compliance with
the requirements of Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-7 (1981).
[22] With regard to the V & H Enterprises' Ben, Mabel Stringham signed the
notice for V A H Enterprises. Then, beneath that signature, the following declaration appears:
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Mabel E Stringham, being duly sworn, deposes and says that (he) (she) is Stringham Lumber Co., claimant- in the foregoing Notice of
Lien, that he has read said hen and knows the
contents thereof, and that the same is true of his
own knowledge.
/s/Mabel E. Stringham/s/
Subscribed and sworn before me this
day of
, 1982.
[SEAL]

Dick L Smith
Notary Public,residingat
Bountiful
My Commission Expires
08-18-84

The only defect in this notice occurs in
the acknowledgment where Mabel Stringham wrote, in the second blank, the words

tnc, 394 P.2d 383, 15 Utah 2d 427 (1964), where
the court held that a letter, written by the insurer of the corporation's vehicle, mailed to the
collision insurer of the other vehicle, and stat-

would be considered as soon as the personal
injury claims were settled, would not estop the
corporation from raising as a defense to the
action brought by the collision insurer the rule

ino that th*» mllicinn incnrwrV aiHmcrsitiftn r4aim

acrainsf sniiftincr a raitcr of action.
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"Stringham Lumber" instead of "V & H
Enterprises." The court has already concluded that, under the law of Utah, there is
no essential requirement that the person
taking the oath and making the acknowledgment state his, her, or its relationship
to the claimant. The requirement is only
that the claimant or the person signing on
behalf of the claimant sign the notice and
that the same signatory also take and sign
the oath and acknowledgment Here Mabel Stringham signed the notice for V & H
Enterprises, and she took and signed the
oath and acknowledgment as required.
The notary's certificate is proper. The lien
is, therefore, valid.

holder will also have priority over every
prior unrecorded interest of which said
holder did not have actual knowledge ("actual knowledge" being inferred from the
circumstances).
[23] Claude Hawk recorded its second
trust deed on December 2, 1981, subsequent to the recording of these mechanics'
liens, all of which relate back to June 4,
1981. In spite of this fact, Claude Hawk's
lien has priority. This is because the lien
rights of mechanics, which arise when the
debt owed to them is incurred, are created
by statute and must be preserved by the
filing of a valid notice of lien within the
time limits set by the law. The failure of
certain of these lien claimants to properly
perfect their liens with valid lien notices
resulted in "the expiration of their lien
rights within 80 days for subcontractors
and 100 days for general contractors.

With regard to the Stringham Lumber
Co/s lien notice, Claude Hawk withdrew its
objection thereto, which is just as well
since this court was unable to find any
defect in that notice.
The court also finds that Parley White
has a valid judgment lien against the proceeds of the sale of the property of the
estate.
(2)
The Priority of the Mechanics' Liens
In light of the foregoing analysis of the
validity of the various statutory mechanics'
liens charged against the proceeds of the
sale of real property of the estate, it is the
court's conclusion that Claude Hawk has a
security interest with priority over all the
liens found herein to be invalid. The court
bases this opinion on the provisions of Utah
Code Ann. Section 57-3-2, -3 (1953, as
amended), which provide that a holder of a
recorded interest in real property will have
priority over every subsequent interest,
whether recorded or unrecorded, and such

[24,25] Because their lien rights expired, Claude Hawk's trust deed, which the
court has examined and finds facially valid,
has priority over all those liens whose notices the court has found to be invalid here.
The court need not consider, in this case,
whether or not Claude Hawk, as a subsequent recorder, had actual knowledge of
the prior existence of the unrecorded (that
is, unrecorded by virtue of their invalidity)
interests of these lien claimants. These
claimants should have perfected their
rights, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section
38-1-7 (1953), long before the debtor filed
his petition on July 14, 1982, which filing
took place well over the 100 days after the
last work was completed or last materials
furnished on February^ 25, 1982.11 Of

11. Had the time period for perfecting these mechanics' liens under state law extended beyond
the date of the filing of the petition, then the
lienholders could have had ten days in which to
perfect their lien rights. COLLIER'S 15th ed.
contains the following explanation of the pertinent provisions of the Code governing this procedure: .
. ... The intervention of a petition under title
11 should not cut off an interest holder's
opportunity to perfect where the interest holder could have perfected against an entity subsequently acquiring rights in the property if

~ "* bankruptcy had not intervened. There is no
time limit other than as provided under nonbankruptcy law, and section 362(b)(3) provides an exception from the automatic stay to
permit such perfection. The exception to this
general rule is contained in section
547(eX2)(C) which limits post-petition perfection in the context of the preference section to
10 days after the transfer takes effect between
the parties.
Thus, under section 9-301(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code, perfection of a purchase money security interest within ten days
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course, those few remaining valid mechanics' liens, whose dates of filing relate back
to the date the first work was performed or
the first materials furnished, will continue
to have priority over the second trust deed
of Claude Hawk, while the judgment lien of
Parley White dba Parley White Realty, because it attached to the subject property
after the time Claude Hawk perfected its
lien, will continue to have a priority standing inferior to that of Claude Hawk.
(3)
The Trust Deed Issue
Having addressed the questions pertinent to the first two issues in. this case,12
the court now turns to the arguments of
State Savings and Loan Association.
The issue raised by State Savings is
whether or not a duly recorded document
constitutes an independent second trust
deed with a separate and inferior priority
standing or whether it is, instead, a notice
of advance of additional funds secured by
State Savings' first trust deed which has
superior priority to all other encumbrances
against the proceeds of sale.
The first trust deed of State Savings is
dated June 3, 1981 and was executed by
John H. Williamson as trustor in favor of
State Savings and Loan Association as
trustee and beneficiary; it wal recorded in
Salt Lake County as Entry No. 3571498 on
June 4, 1981, in Book 5255 at page number
1351. That trust deed contained the following language:
of its making will relate back to defeat an
intervening lien creditor whose rights arise
during the period between the making of the
security agreement and its perfection. In this
situation, the trustee, as an intervening lien
creditor, cannot avoid the purchase money
security interest that is unperfected on the
date the petition is filed, so long as the holder
of the purchase money security interest later
perfects within the prescribed ten-day period.
The same analysis would also apply to the
holder of mechanic's lien, if state law would
permit perfection to relate back so as to defeat an intervening lien creditor
For a
discussion of the effect of Section 546(b) on a
holder of mechanic's lien, see In re Saberman,
[3 B.R. 316 (Bkrtcy.Ct.N.D.I11.1980)].
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. . . Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST,
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following
described property, situated in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah:
LOT 6, ARLINGTON HILLS SUBDIVISION PLAT "F", ACCORDING TO
THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON
FILE AND ON RECORD IN THE
SALT LAKE COUNTY RECORDER'S
OFFICE.
Together with all buildings, fixtures, . . .
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1)
payment of the indebtedness evidenced
by a promissory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $200,000.00
made by Trustor, . . . (2) the performance
of each and every obligation, covenant,
promise, and agreement of Trustor herein and in said note contained; (3) the
payment of such additional loans or advances as hereafter may be made to
Trustor or his successors in title or assigns, for any purpose, at any time before the cancellation of this Trust Deed,
when evidenced i>y promissory note or
notes or agreement reciting that they are
secured by this Trust Deed provided that
nothing herein contained shall be considered as limiting the amounts that shall
be secured hereby when advanced to protect the security or in accordance with
covenants in the Trust Deed; and (4) the
payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 15th ed., J 546.-'
03(2] at pp. 546-8 to 546-9. In this case, however, the lien rights of the mechanics expired
prior to the filing of the petition by the debtor.
12. Claude Hawk's argument that the lienholders' failure to commence an action to foreclose
their liens within 12 months, as required by
Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-5 (1981), is without merit for two reasons: first, the automatic
stay prevented the lienholders from bringing
such an action against the debtor or the estate;
and, second, Section 108(c) of the Code tolls the
time for the bringing of such an action until the
later of (a) the end of such period of time or (b)
30 days after the stay is terminated pursuant to
Section 362(c) and (d) of the Code. See, In re
Cruseturner, 8 B.R. 581 (Bkrtcy.Ct.Utah 1981).
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to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon as herein provided.
Moreover, an accompanying document,
entitled "Additional Advance Note and
Agreement" for $45,000.00 dated December 1981, and recorded on December 2,
1981, contained the following language:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned jointly and severally promise to
pay to the order of STATE SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION . . . the sum
of $45,000 . . . and this agreement is
hereby made a part of the original note
and TRUST DEED representing said
loan dated June 3, 1981, and recorded
June 4, 1981, Book 5255 at page 1351 of
the records of the County Recorder of
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH.

court is asked, in the alternative, to determine whether the debtor is entitled to payment of a real estate commission as an
administrative expense for his role as a
listing agent in the sale of the property of
the estate.
The Bankruptcy Code allows states to
pre-empt federal exemptions. Section
522(b). Utah has acted to pre-empt the
exemptions provided under applicable federal law. For this reason, Utah law governs in this case. See, In re Neiheisel, 32
B.R. 146 (Bkrtcy.CtD.Utah 1983).
In Utah, the homestead exemption is required by the Utah Constitution, Art XXII,
Section 1:
The Legislature shall provide by law, for
the selection by each head of a family, an
exemption of a homestead, which may
It is clear from these documents that it
consist of one or more parcels of lands,
was the intent of the parties that State
together with the appurtenances and imSavings advance an additional sum of $45,provements thereon of the value of at
000.00 to the debtor, which sum was to be
least fifteen hundred dollars, from sale
secured by the first trust deed recorded
or execution.
June 4, 1981. It is also clear that the
parties did not intend by these or any other The Utah homestead exemption, enacted
documents to create a second trust deed in pursuant to this constitutional mandate, appears as part of the Utah Exemption Act of
favor of State Savings for $45,000.00.
1981, Utah Code Ann. Section 78-23-1 et
[26] In Utah the advance of additional seq. (1953). That act, in pertinent part,
funds secured by a previously executed and provides that
otherwise valid trust deed is allowed in
(1) A homestead consisting of property
circumstances where the note and trust
in this state shall be exempt in an
deed contain clear language that the paramount not exceeding $8000 in value for
ties intend to avail themselves of this type
a head of family, $2000 in value for a
of arrangement See, Bank ofEphraim v.
spouse, and $500 in value for each other
Davis, 559 P.2d 538 (Utah 1977).
dependent . . .
(2) A homestead shall be exempt from
[27] Here there is clear and unambigujudicial lien and from levy, execution, or
ous documentary evidence of this intent
forced sale, except upon the following
For these reasons the court finds that the
obligations:
documents entitled "Additional Advance
(a) Statutory liens for taxes and asNote and Agreement," dated December 2,
sessments on the property;
1981, is a promissory note evidencing the
(b) Security interests in the property
advance of additional funds secured by
and judicial liens for debts created for
State Savings' first trust deed.
the purchase price of such property; and
(4) The Homestead Exemption Issue
(c) Judicial liens obtained on debts created
by failure to provide support or
The final issue raised in this case is
maintenance
for dependent children.
whether or not the debtor's claimed homeUtah
Code
Ann.
Section 78-23-3 (1981).
stead exemption is valid and, if so, what
priority it has. In the event the court
In this case, the debtor is claiming a
denies debtor his homestead exemption, the homestead exemption of $8,000.00. That
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exemption must be paid to him out of the
proceeds of the sale of the property of the
estate, and it must be paid to him prior to
the satisfaction of any judicial lien, levy,
execution, or forced sale, but with certain
exceptions listed in Utah Code Ann. Section
78-23-3(2)(aHc) (1953). Three of these exceptions do not apply in this case: (1) statutory liens for taxes, (2) statutory liens for
assessments, and (3) judicial liens obtained
on debts created by failure to provide support or maintenance for dependent children.
There are two exceptions to the homestead exemption that may apply in this
case: (1) security interests and (2) judicial
liens for debts created for the purchase
price of property.
Here, the subject property is encumbered
by (1) the first trust deed of State Savings,
(2) the valid statutory mechanics* liens of
Stringham Lumber Co., V & H Enterprises,
and Aire Flo Heating and Electric, (3) the
second trust deed of Claude Hawk and (4)
the judicial lien of Parley White dba Parley
White Realty. The question is which, if
any, of these encumbrances constitutes an
exception to the debtor's homestead exemption by virtue of being either a security
interest or a judicial lien for a<lebt created
for the purchase price of the property.
Upon the answer to this question turns the
court's determination of which, if any, of
these claimants are to be paid from the
proceeds of the sale before the debtor is
paid his $8,000.00 homestead exemption.
Since the controlling provisions of Utah
law were enacted in 1981, no case interpreting the pertinent parts of the homestead
exemption provisions has been handed
down. Thus, it befalls this court to interpret the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 78-23-3(2)(b) (1981). In doing so, the
court is not without guidance. In their
analysis of the Utah homestead exemption,
the editors of Summary of Utah Real
Property Law, state the following:
By virtue of his homestead right, a judgment debtor is not excused from execution against homestead property to satisfy debts by lawful mortgage on the
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premises or debts created for the purchase price of the premises.
1 SUMMARY OF UTAH REAL PROPERTY LAW (J. Reuben Clark Law School:
Brigham Young University, 1978) p. 201.
The editors rely for this conclusion upon
the case of McMurdie v. Chugg, 99 Utah
403, 107 P.2d 163 (1940). That case is,
obviously, not interpreting the current
homestead law of Utah; however, its holding, that vendor's liens on property in the
amount of the unpaid purchase price thereof cannot be defeated by a later arising
claim of a homestead exemption, is instructive.
*
It appears that this policy was preserved
in the 1981 Utah Exemption Act, where the
legislature created, as an exception to the
homestead exemption:
Security interests in the property and
judicial liens for debts created for the
purchase price of such property. .
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-23-3(2)(b)
(i981).
[28,29] This provision denominates two
exceptions: the first is "security interests,"
and the second is "judicial liens for debts
created for the purchase price' of such property." It is the opinion of this court that
the phrase "for the debts created for the
purchase price of such property" found in
this section modifies the term ^'judicial
liens" only; it does not modify the term
"security interests." This court concludes
that the term "security interests," in this
provision of the Utah Exemption Act, includes, but is not limited to, security interests for the purchase price of the property
to which the security interest attaches.
For the term "security interest" was meant
to embrace any consensual security interest in the property by which the owner of
said property voluntarily pledges that property as security for a debt regardless of
the purpose of the debt This interpretation is necessary in order to protect creditors who obtain from debtors, by means of
consensual security agreements, liens upon
the debtor's property. In view of the consensual nature of these security agreements, a creditor's lien rights arising there-
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on should not be defeated by the debtor's
claim of a homestead exemption. The
same protection is not warranted to creditors holding lien rights against the debtor's
property that do not arise upon the voluntary acquiescence of the debtor who agrees
to pledge his property as security in order
to obtain a loan, but, rather, arise under a
statute (as in the case of the mechanics'
liens in this case) or as a result of a judicial
action.
In view of this opinion, the court concludes that the first trust deed of State
Savings and the second trust deed of
Claude Hawk are "security interests" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. Section
78-2&-3(2)(b) (1953) which cannot be defeated by debtor's claim for homestead exemption.
[30] The court further concludes that
the valid statutory mechanics' liens
charged against the sale proceeds do not
constitute "security interests" within the
meaning of these provisions because there
is no evidence before the court that these
liens arose under contracts, rather these
lien rights arose under statute and are not
consensual. Moreover, the term "statutory
lien," though defined in Utah's Exemption
Act of 1981 (Utah Code Ann. Section 7823-1 et seq. (1953)), is not applied in the
subsections dealing with exceptions to the
homestead exemption—an omission by the
Utah legislature that clearly evidences an
intent not to include "statutory liens," such
as mechanic's liens, in the list of exceptions. Since these mechanic's liens are not
"security interests' because they are not
consensual and since they are not "judicial
liens for debts created for the purchase
price of such property" because they arose
under a statute and not as a result of a
judicial action, they are not valid exceptions
to the homestead exemption. Consequently, the debtor's homestead exemption must
13. See, Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. Vance,
32 Utah 74/88 P. 896 (1907) where the Utah
Supreme Court invalidated as unconstitutional a
statutory provision that made homestead exemptions subject to mechanic's liens on grounds
that such liens were nonconsensual. Whether
or not the debtor's homestead exemption would

be paid before any proceeds are distributed
to the valid mechanics' lienholders in this
case.13
[31] The court finds that the judicial
lien of Parley White dba Parley White Realty which, according to the debtor's schedules, arose upon a judgment entered in the
Utah District Court in and for Salt Lake
County in the sum of $14,860.00 on May 5,
1982, is not a "security interest" for the
reason that it did not arise by consent of
the debtor. There is no evidence in the
record that this judicial lien is for a debt
created for the purchase price of the property. The court, therefore, finds that the
lien of Parley dba Parley White Realty is
not an exception to the debtor's homestead
exemption.
As a result, the debtor's homestead exemption must be satisfied from the sale
proceeds before all other liens and encumbrances with the exception of the first
trust deed of State Savings and the second
trust deed of Claude Hawk.
In view of the decision that this debtor is
entitled to his homestead exemption, it will
not be necessary to address the issue of his
alternative claim to a real estate commission as an administrative expense.
CONCLUSION
The court finds that the notice of sale by
the bankruptcy trustee together with the
court's approval of that sale operated to
extinguish the original liens upon the real
property of the estate and to create for
each holder of a valid statutory or judicial
lien or valid security interest a new secured
position, which was in all pertinent respects
equivalent to the original, against the proceeds of sale.
Furthermore, in applying the appropriate
provisions of Utah law, this court concludes
that the complete absence of an essential
have defeated the claims of these mechanics'
lienholders if they had, by means of foreclosure
actions, reduced their lien claims to judgments
and claimed that such judgments constituted
judicial liens for the purchase price of the property, is not an argument before the court.
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element of the oath, the acknowledgment,
or the certificate required on a mechanic's
lien notice will render that notice invalid.
In this case 12 notices of lien were invalidated because of the absence of one or more
of these essential elements. The court also
concludes that the lien rights of these
claimants, recording invalid notices of lien,
expired under Utah law within 80 days for
a subcontractor and 100 days for a general
contractor after the last work was completed or the last materials furnished to the
subject property. Consequently, the valid
recorded second trust deed of Claude Hawk
has priority over these invalid liens (regardless whether or not Claude Hawk had "actual knowledge" of their prior existence)
because they expired due to lack of perfection by proper notice. Only those mechanics recording valid notices of lien continue
to hold claims with priority over that of
Claude Hawk.
Moreover, the first trust deed of State
Savings is found to secure not only the
original note for $200,000.00 but the additional advance of $45,000.00 (less $10,000.00 in loan funds never paid out to the
debtor).
Finally, the debtor is found to have a
valid homestead exemption, perfected by
recordation on August 26, 1981, and that
said homestead exemption will defeat the
interests of claimants holding valid mechanics' liens as well as claimants holding
judicial liens not incurred for debts created
for the purchase price of the subject property; consequently, debtor's homestead exemption is subject only to the security interests of State Savings and Claude Hawk.
An order consistent with this memorandum opinion will enter.
CASE SUMMARY
This matter came before the Court on
January 19, 1984, on the application of
Claude Hawk Corporation for distribution
of the proceeds remaining after the previously authorized distribution of proceeds of
the trustee's sale of the debtor's real property located at 575 Cambridge Circle, Salt
Lake City, Utah, and for an order determin-
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ing the distributive priority of claims to the
sales proceeds.
The Court, being fully advised in the
premises and having fully considered the
motions, memoranda, arguments, and submissions of the parties, issued, on July 11,
1984, its Memorandum Opinion (Amended).
This July 11 Memorandum constituted its
findings of fact and conclusions of law in
this matter and provided that an order consistent therewith be prepared, under local
rules, by counsel for the prevailing party.
In due course, an order was prepared by
Claude Hawk's attorney, Joel R. Dangerfield. On July 19,1984, an objection thereto was filed by debtor's attorney, Wendell
P. Abies. The Court has read the proposed
order as well as the objection and the counter-proposal of the debtor. The Court being duly advised, now issues this Supplemental Memorandum Opinion and Order
for the benefit of the parties hereto and
their attorneys.
SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM OPINION
[32] On the basis of the analysis set
forth in its Memorandum Opinion of July
11, 1984, this Court concludes that, under
Utah's race-notice statute [Section 57-3-2,
-3 Utah Code Ann. (Pocket Supp.1983) 1
the following valid encumbrances in the
following order of priority originally attached to the property at 575 Cambridge
Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah:
(1) The first trust deed of State Savings;
(2) The statutory mechanics' liens of V &
H Enterprises, Stringham Lumber Co.,
and Aire Flo Heating;
(3) The second trust deed of Claude
Hawk Corp.; and
(4) The judicial lien of Parley White Realty.
However, by mandate of the Utah Constitution, Art XXII, Sectiori 1 and the Utah
Exemption Act [Section 78-23-1, et seq.
Utah Code Ann. (Pocket Supp.1983)] a
homestead exemption, regardless of when
it is claimed or recorded, takes priority
over all other liens and encumbrances bur-
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dening the subject property with the exception of those encumbrances listed in Section 78-23-3(2XaHc) Utah Code Ann.
(Pocket Supp.1983)'. By virtue of Utah's
exemption statute, debtor's homestead exemption takes priority over all the other
encumbrances except the consensual security interests in the property which the debtor conveyed to State Savings and Loan
Association and to Claude Hawk Corporation.
The net effect of Utah's homestead exemption law is to re-order the priorities of
the encumbrances upon the subject property, as follows:
(1) The first trust deed of State Savings;
(2) The second trust deed of Claude
Hawk;
(3) The debtor's homestead exemption;
(4) The valid mechanics' liens of V & H
Enterprises, Stringham Lumber, and
Aire Flo Heating; and
(5) The judicial lien of Parley White Realty.
The priorities established by Utah's racenotice statute [Section 57-3-2, -3 Utah
Code Ann. (Pocket Supp.1983) ] and Utah's
mechanic's lien law [Section 38-1-7 Utah
Code Ann. (Pocket Supp.1983)], are superceded by the constitutional and statutory
requirements of Utah's homestead exemption law [Section 78-23-1 et seq. Utah Code
Ann. (Pocket Supp.1983)]. Whatever the
original priorities may have been, a claim
of homestead take precedence over them
all, with those exceptions mentioned.
What the Court requires in this case is that
debtor's homestead exemption allowance of
$8,000.00 be paid before all other liens and
encumbrances, except the security interests of State Savings and Claude Hawk.
The Court does not speculate upon what
final distributive prioritization would have
resulted had the holders of the valid mechanic's liens reduced their claims to judgments.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth in this Court's
Memorandum Opinion of July 11, 1984 and

in this Supplemental Memorandum Opinion,
it is hereby
ORDERED that the debtor be, and hereby is, determined to have a valid homestead
exemption, perfected by recordation on August 26, 1981, that said homestead exemption will take priority over and defeat the
interest of the below named claimants holding valid mechanic's liens, as well as claimants holding judicial liens not incurred for
debts created for the purchase price of the
subject property, and that the debtor's
homestead exemption is subject only to the
security interests of State Savings and
Loan Association and Claude Hawk Corporation and is subordinate in priority to such
security interests; and it is further
ORDERED that Theodore E. Kanell,
trustee, upon the expiration of 10 days
following the entry of this order, be, and he
hereby is, directed forthwith to make distribution of the balance of the proceeds of the
August 15, 1983 trustee's sale of the debtor's real property, in the approximate
amount of $121,450.00, plus any interest
earned thereon, and after payment of any
unpaid costs of sale, closing costs, real
estate taxes, and allowable trustee's fees,
in the priority, subject to the foregoing
paragraph, and amounts as follows:
1. The secured debt owed to State Savings and Loan Association, evidenced by
the deed of trust recorded in Salt Lake
County on December 2, 1981, as Entry No.
3628145 in the sum of $45,000.00, which
relates back, for purposes of priority, to
the State Savings and Loan first deed of
trust dated June 4, 1981, and recorded as
Entry No. 3571498 (reduced by $10,000.00
which was never paid out to the debtor),
plus any allowed interest, costs, and attorney's fees pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section
506(b).
2. The secured debt owed to Claude
Hawk Corporation evidenced by the trust
deed recorded in Salt Lake County on December 2, 1981, as Entry No. 3628146 in
the sum of $44,950.00 with interest at the
annual rate of 15 percent from June 3,
1981, yielding $18.47 per day, plus costs, a
reasonable attorney's fee pursuant to 11
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U.S.C. Section 506(b) (which debt Claude
Hawk agreed to subordinate to the interest*
>f State Savings).
3. The homestead exemption allowance
pursuant to Section 78-23-1 et seq. Utah
Code Ann. (Pocket Supp.1983) in the
imount of $8,000.00 to John H. Williamson,
4. The mechanic's lien filed by V & H
Enterprises, recorded May 12, 1982, as Entry No. 3764554 in the amount of $4,720.09;
the mechanic's lien filed by Stringham
Lumber Co., recorded May 12, 1982, as
Entry No. 3674555 in the amount of
£2,469.88; and the mechanic's lien filed by
kire Flo Heating & Electric and Earl J.
Hamert, as Entry No. 3687115 in the
imount of $669.64-—all three of which liens
^elate back to June 4, 1981, when the first
ffork began on or the first materials were
furnished to the subject property.
5. The judgment lien filed by Parley
iVhite dba Parley White Realty in a judgment against the debtor, filed May 6, 1982,
Case No. C-81-8096 in the District Court of
Salt Lake-County Clerk's Office in the sum
)f $14,860.00.
(o

f KEY NUMBER SYSTIM>

In re Malcolm E. DUNCAN and Genita
P. Duncan, Debtors.
In re Marion GEORGE, d/b/a Marion
George Janitorial, Debtor.
Bankruptcy Nos. 3-83-00161,
3-83-00216.
United States Bankruptcy Court,
D. Alaska.
Aug. 10, 1984.
In two cases in which debtors sought
to avoid judicial liens for impairment of
homestead exemptions, the Bankruptcy
Court, J. Douglas Williams, II, J., held that:
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(1) since there was sufficient value in debtr
ors' homestead property to support homestead exemption after subtracting first
deed of trust and judicial lien, which was
second in priority to first deed of trust,
judicial lien did not create impairment of
exemption which would result from deduction of unavoidable junior federal tax liens,
and thus could not be avoided,' but (2)
where amount of judicial lien, when deducted in order of priority from value of second
debtor's property less homestead exemption, exceeded remainder by $12,062.97, judicial lien would be avoided to that extent
Order accordingly.

1. Bankruptcy e=>398(l)
To avoid a judicial lien under Bankruptcy Code, it must be determined if debtors have an exemption which is impaired,
and, if so, to what extent judicial lien .creates that impairment. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.
C.A. § 522(f).
2. Bankruptcy e»398(l)
In order to determine extent to which a
lien impairs an exemption, and thus is
avoidable, priority of lien for which avoidance is being sought must be considered.
Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f).
3. Bankruptcy <S=>398(1)
Judicial liens can be avoided for impairment of exemptions only if they impair
exemptions while still occupying their position of priority among liens on subject
properties.
Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 522(f).
4. Bankruptcy e»398(l)
Since there was sufficient value in
debtors' homestead "property to support
homestead exemption after subtracting
first deed of trust and judicial lien, which
was second in priority to first deed of trust,
judicial lien did not create impairment of
exemption which would result from deduction of unavoidable junior federal tax liens,
and thus could not be avoided. Bankr.
Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f).

